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Lippe: The Uneasy Partnership

THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP:
The Balance of Power Between Congressand the
Supreme Court in Interpretationof
The Civil War Amendments
EMIL LIPPE, JR.*

T

HE BASIC THESIS of this article is that the enforcement clauses of the
3
2
thirteenth,' fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments have imposed
strong affirmative duties upon the United States Congress and the Supreme
Court. These duties, due to their very nature, must be exercised in tandem
with each other toward the overall goal of the Civil War Amendments:
the guarantee that the civil rights of no American be denied him on the
basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. In addition, a
special type of constitutional stare decisis operates to prevent both
branches from contracting the rights guaranteed under these amendments.
It will be made clear, therefore, that Congress has the power to enact
legislation, for example, striking down school systems exhibiting so-called
"de facto" racial segregation. But the point of this article is that this power
is no mere reservoir of authority which may or may not be tapped by
Congress according to its whim and caprice. Rather, the language, and
the underlying purpose of the amendments, as well as the momentum
developed by past litigation and legislation thereunder, all combine to
compel Congress to address itself to the problems of "de facto" racial
segregation. With this premise in mind, this article is intended to provide
a policy-making perspective of the duties of the legislative and judicial
branches of the government.

* B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; Order
of the Coif; Associate of the firm of Carrington, Coleman, Sloman, Johnson, &
Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas.
This article was prepared under the supervision of Professor Victor G. Rosenblum, director of senior research work at Northwestern University School of Law.
1 U.S. CONST., amend. xiii, § 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
2 U.S. CONST., amend. xiv, § 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
3 U.S. CONS'r., amend. xv, § 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
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The general test for validity of Congressional enactments
to "enforce" the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifeenth amendments.
The test for validity of statutes purportedly "enforcing" the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments appears to be identical
for all three amendments. It is the same as that under the necessary
and proper clause, 4 which was classically formulated in McCulloch v.
Maryland as follows:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution
[or the amendment in question], and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 5
The enforcement clauses of the three amendments are virtually identical
in wording 6 and have a common historical origin and overall purpose. 7
The Supreme Court has indicated for each amendment that the
appropriate test is that enunciated in McCulloch.8
The first element of the test is that the end of the enactment be
a legitimate one. There has been no indication by the Supreme Court
concerning the precise reach of this element of the test, since, it appears,
the legitimacy of Congressional purposes in past enactments has not been
challenged. It is also doubtful that this element adds anything of
substance to the second (discussed immediately below) and the fourth
(requiring that the law in question be consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution).
The second element of the test is that the end of the enactment in
question lie within the scope of the amendment involved. This is implicit
in the use of the word "enforce." Even without such judicial gloss, it
would be immediately apparent that legislation wholly unrelated to the
substantive provisions of an amendment would not be authorized by
the enforcement clause of that amendment.
One important reason why this second element is significant is that
the substantive provisions of the three amendments are different. What

4 U.S. CONST.,

art. I, § 8, cl. 18. [The Congress shall have Power] to make all Laws

which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
5 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
6 See notes 1-3 supra.
7 See text accompanying note 70 infra.
8See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439, 443-44 (1968) (thirteenth amendment);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (fourteenth amendment); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966) (fifteenth amendment).
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Congress may have power to accomplish under one amendment may not
9
be within its power under another amendment.
Another reason for the significance of this second element of the
test is that the "state action" requirement varies from one amendment
to the other. The thirteenth clearly reaches purely private acts by
individuals.10 It is equally clear that the prohibitions of the fifteenth
amendment are limited to state action."
it
The traditional interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is that
13
2
reasserted. It
only reaches state action. This principle has been recently
appears, however, that the state action requirement under this amendment
will be limited to cases in which the Supreme Court is applying the
amendment of its own force, without Congressional enforcement
legislation. Six members of the Court have expressed the view that
amendment rights
a law prohibiting private interference with fourteenth
14
amendment.
the
of
is authorized by section five
The third element of the general test for validity of Congressional
enforcement legislation under the Civil War Amendments is that the
means be "appropriate," or "plainly adapted," to the end sought. The
significant characteristic of this element is that the Court will not
second-guess a choice of means or a policy decision, but will usually defer
to the Congressional choice. This was clearly illustrated by the Supreme
Court's scrutiny of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach'5 to determine its validity as enforcement of the fifteenth
amendment. The test was very simply stated: "Congress may use any
16
had acted upon
rational means."' The Court merely noted that Congress
18
17
choices.
its
for
some evidence or had some reason
This third element of the test was similarly expressed in Katzenbach
9
which considered the validity of certain other provisions of
Morgan,1
v.
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as enforcement of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court noted that it was up to Congress to weigh the
conflicting values and the Court need only "perceive a basis" for

9 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,23 (1883).
10 Id. at 33.
11 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,218 (1875).
12 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
13United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1966).

14 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 777 (Brennan, J.,joined by Warren, C.J., and
joined by Black and Fortas, J.J.) (1966).
Douglas, J.), 762 (Clark, J.,
15 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
16 Id. at 324.
17 Id. at 329-30.

18 Id.at 334.
19 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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the determination.2 0 Again, the test is merely whether the choice was a
rational one. This is also the standard under the thirteenth amendment.2 '
The fourth element of the test is the requirement that the enactment
be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. This means
simply that other constitutional guarantees retain their validity; the power
to enforce one portion of the Constitution does not authorize the
repeal of another.
For example, although a quasi-legislative, quasi-executive determination that certain states were violating the fifteenth amendment was held
not to be a violation of the bill of attainder clause 22 or the doctrine of
separation of powers, 23 there is every reason to believe that the holding
would be different were a person found guilty. The bill of attainder clause
was intended to implement the doctrine of separation of powers by
preventing legislative punishment of specifically designated individuals or
groups. 24 If Congress were to prohibit a member of the Ku Klux Klan
from practicing law before the Supreme Court unless he signed an oath
declaring he had never violated the civil rights of a black American, the
25
law would probably be struck down.
The most commonly encountered example of conflict with other
constitutional provisions has been the clash of Congressional enactments
with the reserved powers of the states, particularly in the area of voting
qualifications. The general rule remains that the states have power to set
voting qualification standards. 26 When this power is exercised "within the
domain of state interest," the state power is paramount; when it is used to
circumvent a "federally protected right," there is no protection for the
enactment.27 The problem lies in the definition of these two categories.
"Federally protected right" includes both the fifteenth 28 and fourteenth2
amendments. Congress is chiefly responsible for implementing the rights
guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment, 30 and may utilize "any rational
means" 31 to accomplish that purpose. The enforcement clause of the

20ld. at 653.
21 See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968).
22 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl.3.
23 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
24 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
25 Cf. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
26 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
27 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
28 Id.
29 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
30 Id. at 326.
31 Id. at 324.
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fourteenth amendment positively grants Congress the power to exercise
its discretion to determine whether and32what legislation is necessary to
implement that amendment's provisions.
Exactly how far Congress' discretion extends, and the extent of the
Supreme Court's willingness to strike down such enactments, is a difficult
matter. The Supreme Court found no difficulty in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. Morgan arising from the states' reserved
powers. However, when Congress attempted to set a uniform voting age
33
of 18 years in state and local elections, it was held in Oregon v. Mitchell
that this exceeded Congressional authority under the enforcement clause
of the fourteenth amendment. It is not clear what the basis for this holding
was, however, because there was no majority opinion in the case.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, Justice Black argued that allowing Congress
to set the minimum voting age for all elections would, if carried to its
logical end, render the states "impotent figureheads. ' '3 4 His point was well
taken. The states' powers to set minimum age requirements for voting had
often been recognized in dictum. 35 If this power to set age requirements
could be overridden by a purported Congressional determination of an
equal protection violation, 36 then little indeed would be left of this state
power to set voting qualifications.
Probably the key distinction for explaining the different outcome in
the two Katzenbach cases and Oregon v. Mitchell is the nature of the
state practices at which the statutes were aimed. The former two cases
both involved practices which Congress had determined were being
utilized to deny the right to vote and the equal protection of the laws to
certain racial minority groups. Nothing could be closer to the central
purpose of the Civil War Amendments. Justice Black argued that although
the fourteenth amendment does reach discrimination other than racial
discrimination, different standards should prevail for racial and non-racial
discrimination.3 7 He argued that the fourteenth amendment was not
intended to render every distinction between groups of people an equal
protection violation, but that it was designed to strike down every
38
distinction, "however trifling," based upon race.
His argument seems fundamentally sound. Where the Supreme Court
is applying the equal protection clause 39 of its own force, it has fashioned
3

2 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Id. at 126 (opinion of Black, J.)
35 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969).
33
34
36

See text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 126-27 (opinion of Black, J.)
Id. at 127.
39 U.S. CONST., amend. xiv, § 1.
37
38
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exceptionally stringent tests for the validity of enactments which classify
on the basis of race. 40 By so doing, the Court can retain the especial
solicitude for the elimination of racial discrimination which prompted
passage of the Civil War Amendments in the first place, and yet allow
extension of the amendments to non-racial matters where their plain
wording warrants such extension. And, in this specific case, the Court
can yield proper respect to the reserved powers of the states without
weakening either the central purpose of the amendments or Congress'
discretionary power to enforce that purpose.
A final example of the requirement that Congressional enforcement
legislation be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution is
that the legislation must not run contrary to what is prohibited by the
amendment of its own force. 4 '

The extent of Congress' power to "expand" or "dilute"
Supreme Court interpretations of the thirteenth, fourteenth,
and fifteenth amendments: a narrow view.
First, Congress can merely enact legislation to abrogate and override
state legislation which has been found by the Supreme Court to violate
the substantive provisions of these three amendments. 42 This much at
least is immediately apparent from the use of the word "enforce."
Second, Congress may inform "the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizing the 'majestic generalities' "43 of the substantive provisions
of the amendments. This could be accomplished by holding extensive
hearings to determine that the civil rights of a particular minority were
being denied, and by conducting intensive examination into the methods
being used to accomplish such purposes.
Third, Congress can act to enhance the efficacy or speed the remedy
for judicially determined violations by providing alternative procedural
machinery. This was one of the aims of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
The background to passage of the Act was a long history of state reliance
upon discriminatorily administered literacy tests and other devices in order
to circumvent the fifteenth amendment's guarantees. 44 The Court had
struck down many such devices on its own,4 5 and Congress had sought to
facilitate case-by-case litigation against such practices. 46 The result was
4oRacial classifications must be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). A very heavy burden of justification is
required for upholding a racial classification. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
41 See text accompanying note 66 infra.
42 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49.
43 Id.
44

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311-12.

4 Id. at 329.
4 Id. at 313.
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only minimal improvement of black voter registration, mainly because of
the burdens, expense, and delays inherent in case-by-case litigation and
because of evasion or defiance of court orders. 47 Congress' response was
decisive: upon a finding by the Attorney General that certain specific
conditions were met, he could order the automatic suspension of tests
or devices which could be used to deprive citizens of their right to
48
vote. The Court upheld these provisions of the Act.
Fourth, Congress can itself determine that certain devices, although
not themselves violative of the amendment's substantive provisions, are
being utilized to effect violations, and legislate against such devices. 49 An
ideal example can be found in the coverage formula used by the Voting
Rights Act. Congress found that in many states literacy tests and other
qualification devices were fair on their face, but had been framed in such
a way as to facilitate discriminatory application by administering officials.so
And these devices had actually been used to deny blacks the right to
vote. 5 ' Accordingly, Congress authorized the Attorney General to suspend
the use of such tests and devices where there was a low voting rate for
racial minorities, and the Supreme Court upheld use of the formula.5 2
It is this aspect of Congressional enforcement power which is said to
authorize Congressional legislation against private conduct which the
substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment would not reach of
their own force.5 The rights created by the fourteenth amendment are
rights of the individual vis-A-vis the state, but these rights may be just
as effectively denied by purely private action, hence it is argued that
Congress should be allowed to punish such private interference with
fourteenth amendment rights.5
Thus, under this fourth area of Congressional power, it seems clear
that Congress may reach activities untouchable by the Supreme Court in
applying the particular amendment of its own force.5 The question is just
how far this power goes. It is rather clear that Congress may not attempt
to legislate concerning matters wholly unrelated to the objectives of the
particular amendment. Legislation under section two of the fifteenth
amendment, for example, has been invalidated only when addressed to

Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 308.
49 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-53.
50 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 333-34.
51 Id. at 329.
52 Id. at 330.
47
48

53

See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49.
54
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evils "not comprehended" by the amendment 56-viz.,
reaching wholly
private action 57 or even forbidding infringements of the right to vote
which were not racially motivated.5 8 But if Congress attacks an evil
arguably within the scope of the amendment-the Supreme Court will
probably defer to that decision. A good example is the Court's approach
in Jones v. Mayer.59 There, the Court noted that Congress' determination
that certain practices constituted badges and incidents of slavery, and
therefore must be prohibited to promote the ban on slavery, need
60
only be a rational determination.
Fifth, Congress can itself legislatively determine that specific practices
violate the amendments and then legislate against them. In a limited
sense, Congress is allowed to adjudicate, through the legislative process,
the issue of a specific violation. The bill of attainder clause will
undoubtedly prevent Congressional legislation aimed at individuals or
groups of persons. 61 Thus, this power is limited to the determination
of state violations of the amendments.
The Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan upheld the challenged Act on
two alternative grounds: that the legislation was "plainly adapted" or
appropriate to furtherance of the aims of the equal protection
clause,6 2 and that the legislation was aimed at eliminating an invidious
discrimination in establishing voter qualifications. 63 The latter ground was
a Congressional determination that the use of the English literacy requirement to deny persons educated in Puerto Rico the right to vote constituted
an equal protection violation. The most noteworthy aspect of the Court's
discussion is, again, the extreme deference accorded to the Congressional
determination. The Court stated that it was sufficient to be able to
"perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate" its judgment. 64
If Congress has such wide power to extend the scope and enhance
the effectiveness of the substantive guarantees of the thirteenth, fourteenth,
and fifteenth amendments, sheer logic would lead to the conclusion that
Congress could also act to restrict the scope or dilute the effectiveness of
the guarantees. Such, indeed, was the essence of an argument posed by

56

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.

57 James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903).
58 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. at 218.
59 392 U.S. 409 (1968).

60 Id. at 440-41.
61 See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
384 U.S. at 652-53.
Id. at 653-56.
64 Id. at 656.
62
63
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Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in Katzenbach v. Morgan.6 The majority
in that case gave the argument short shrift by responding as follows:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent... section 5 does not grant
Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to
enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due
process decisions of this Court." We emphasize that Congress' power
under section 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the Amendment: section 5 grants Congress no power
to restrict, abrogate or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an
enactment authorizing the states to establish racially segregated
systems of education would not be-as required by section 5-a
measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection
Clause since that clause
66
of its own force prohibits such state laws.
"Of its own force" means the amendment as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. Where Congress expands the amendment's scope, 67 the Court will
usually defer to such expansion. But where Congress seeks to exercise its
power in the opposite direction, the Supreme Court seems to say that
its interpretation of the amendment rather than that by Congress
conclusively settles the matter. On its face, this seems a strange and
quixotic doctrine. It sounds as if the Court were committed, as a matter
of policy, to the promotion of legislation accomplishing certain goals
and the defeat of legislation opposing those goals. It is no answer to
assert simply that Congress cannot-and end the matter there. Adherence
to principled adjudication-the rule of laws and not of men-compels
a reasoned response.
Precisely because of the ultra-sensitive nature of the subject matter
involved, one must take this objection with utmost seriousness. It
resurrects the "settled" doctrine of Marbury v. Madison68 all over again.
And, perhaps more than any other area of constitutional law under
contemporary conditions, it is not unlikely that an institutional power
clash, perhaps of the dimension of Worcester v. Georgia,69 could occur.

6 384
66 384

U.S. at 668.
U.S. at 651 n. 10.
67Morgan dealt only with Congress' power under the enforcement clauses of the

fourteenth amendment. It is this writer's position that the principle under discussion
is not to be limited solely to the fourteenth amendment, but includes all three of the
Civil War Amendments. The enforcement clauses of each are virtually identical in
wording, see notes 1-3 supra, the amendments have a common historical origin and
purpose, see text accompanying note 70 infra, the test for validity of "enforcement"
legislation is the same for all three amendments, see text accompanying notes 7-8
supra, and the Court's discussion in Morgan was not explicitly limited to the
fourteenth amendment enforcement power.
68 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6
9 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6Pet.) 214 (1832).
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The balance of power between Congress and the Supreme Court
in interpretation of the Civil War Amendments viewed
in perspective: The Uneasy Partnership.
The three amendments under discussion are called "the Civil War
Amendments" because they had their origin in that bitter and bloody
war. Their one overall purpose was to eradicate slavery and all its
vestiges. 70 Yet, from the time of their passage to the present day, racial
discrimination and hatred have infected the entire nation, North and
South. Passions are still inflamed and political battles continue to be
won and lost due to matters of race.
The central purpose of this article is to place Congressional and
Supreme Court powers concerning these amendments in perspective
and to argue that the two branches have been thrust into an uneasy
partnership with correlative duties, powers, and restrictions. This thesis
can best be developed by first examining alternative explanations of the
relative balance of powers between Congress and the Supreme Court.
Professor Engdahl has forcefully argued that Congress' power to
define the reach of a particular amendment, as recognized in Katzenbach
v. Morgan,71 cannot be limited to the fourteenth amendment, but "would
72
This would
apply by analogy to every question of federal power."
allow Congress to determine-so long as it had "some basis"-its own
powers as well as those of the other branches of government, and
would amount to "nothing less than a complete repudiation of... the
73
doctrine of judicial review and supremacy."
There are several errors in this analysis. First, it is likely that the
deference exhibited in the second rationale of Katzenbach v. Morgan will
74
Second, the argument
be limited to the three Civil War Amendments.
of responsibility. So
abdication
judicial
with
deference
equates strong

70 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873).

71 See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
72 Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 20
(1970).

73 Id. at21.
74 This is simply because the extreme deference in Morgan to Congressional "adjudication" of an equal protection violation clearly seems to flow from the recognition that
the Civil War Amendments intended Congressionalleadership in their implementation.
See text accompanying notes 85-87 infra.
It is also noteworthy that even though Congress purported to have determined
that denial of the right to vote to those between the ages of 18 and 21 constituted an
invidious discrimination, the Supreme Court refused to accept the determination.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970). The reason for this refusal was
probably that the legislation in Oregon v. Mitchell was not limited to elimination of
racial discrimination. See text accompanying notes 85-87 and 90 infra. In areas outside
of racial discrimination, the reason underlying the need for deference to Congressional
"adjudication" of violations of the amendments disappears.
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long as the Court requires that there be "a basis" for Congressional
determinations, arbitrary and irrational enactments will still fall as
invalid. This amount of deference is apparently no more or less than that
for Congressional enactments challenged under the due process clause.
Such retention of final authority is all that is required to maintain the
viability of judicial review. Indeed, excessive second-guessing by the Court
probably would pose the greatest threat to the viability of judicial review.
Finally, the deference enunciated in Katzenbach v. Morgan will
operate only when Congress acts to expand substantive rights.75
Professor Cox has expressed a view which is somewhat more
impressionistic. He asserts that the Supreme Court decisions may "imply
reluctance to take the initiative without legislative action" 76 and foreshadow greater judicial restraint in the future.77 The crux of his argument
is that "[e]ven within familiar areas of judicial action, the Court's leadership in establishing new goals for the states to achieve in the promotion of
human rights may command less public acceptance than legislative
enactments stamped with the judicial imprimatur of legality."7 8
This view focuses upon two extremely significant factors: the
necessity for obtaining public acceptance of laws to promote civil rights,
and the practical limitations upon the Supreme Court when acting alone
to promote civil rights. To the extent that there is any tendency for
citizens to resist expansion of civil rights, that tendency will be weakened
by firm indications of legitimacy and strengthened by any indication
that the expansion lacks legitimacy. 79
One scholar, Professor Buchanan, has proposed a radical alteration
of the balance of power between the judiciary and the other two branches
of government in all areas of constitutional judicial review. In place of
the present judicial supremacy model he proposes that of "viable tension":
the viable tension model accords no binding force to a Supreme
Court decision; standing alone, a Court decision obligates no one.
The decision may command respect. It may even be followed by the
rest of the nation. But until supported by another branch of
the federal system, the decision has no legal effect. It remains a
weighty, but nonobligatory, pronouncement by one branch of the
federal government.8 0

75 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
76 Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and Promotion of Human Rights, 80
H v.L. REv. 91, 99 (1966).
77 Id. at 121.
78 Id. at 94 (emphasis added).

79
See text accompanying notes 108-111 infra.
80

Buchanan, Judicial Supremacy Re-Examined: A Proposed Alternative, 70 MiciL L.
REv. 1279, 1287 (1972).
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The central fallacy of Professor Buchanan's argument is that it
blithely assumes that the President and the Congress will exercise their
viable tension right of constitutional determination without giving in to
political pressures. That Presidents may choose to defy Supreme Court
decisions for political reasons is alluded to in Marbury v. Madison.u And
that current opposition to court-ordered student busing to end racial
segregation has encouraged the President to propose, and the Congress
to lend a favorable ear to, legislation to prohibit such busing shows that
the other branches of government have not yet acquired the detachment
essential to retention of any semblance of the rule of law under a system
of "viable tension"---especially in the realm of rights for racial minorities.
In the final analysis, Professor Buchanan does concede that "the Supreme
Court is in a better position than Congress and the federal executive
to deliberate calmly and impartially the enduring implications of a
82
particular constitutional construction."
At the other extreme, of course, lies unqualified support of judicial
supremacy: "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
' 83
of the Constitution." Admirable as this may be as an abstract proposition, the fact remains that public acceptance of laws advancing civil rights
is crucial, and that the Supreme Court acting alone faces limitations on
the popular acceptability of its pronouncements. This raises a dilemma:
Congressional support is essential to optimal advancement of civil rights,
but unlimited Congressional power poses the threat of retraction of civil
rights. The answer to this dilemma lies in the unique character and
purpose of the Civil War Amendments, and in the Uneasy Partnership
which they have imposed upon the Supreme Court and Congress.
The very purpose of judicial constitutional review is to interpose
84
a countermajoritarian decision-making body into the legislative process.
This body-the Supreme Court-is to examine laws enacted by the
legislature and actions of the executive to determine their consistency with
constitutional commands and restrictions. When political pressures lead to
enactments contrary to the Constitution, it is the Court's duty to strike
them down. This is good in the general case because it assures optimal
adherence to fundamental legal principles as opposed to the mood of
the moment. It is particularly critical in the especially volatile area
of civil rights.

81 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-166. A President is constitutionally invested with "certain
important political powers," in which he must use his discretion and is accountable
only to the country, not Congress or the Court.
82 Buchanan, supra note 80, at 1301.
83 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
84 A. GOLDBERG, EQuAL JusTIcE

68-71

(1971)
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But the Civil War Amendments envisage Congressional leadership in
the promotion of civil rights. The amendments were designed to free the
Negro race, firmly establish its freedom, and protect it from all forms of
5
oppression.8 And while the terms of the three amendments are susceptible
of liberal construction to achieve these ends, it is nevertheless essential
that their terms be converted into specifics, and that penalties be imposed
for their violation. This must be a dynamic and ongoing process in order
to meet every new and increasingly more subtle manifestation of racial
prejudice. The Court recognized this soon after passage of the amendments:
All of the [Civil War] amendments derive much of their force from
[their enforcement clauses] .... It is the power of Congress which
has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions
by appropriate legislation. Some86 legislation is contemplated to make
the amendments fully effective.
More recently, with specific reference to the fifteenth amendment, the
Court noted that the enforcement clause "indicated that Congress
was to be chiefly8 7 responsible for implementing the rights" created
by the amendment.
Correctly viewed, however, those decisions do much more than call
attention to untapped potential for Congressional legislation. They
indicate the presence of a significant affirmative duty to promote the
central purpose of the Civil War Amendments. Senator Howard, in
introducing the proposed fourteenth amendment to the Senate, described
the enforcement clause as follows:
It casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the
future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in good
faith, and that no State infringes upon the rights of persons or
property. I look upon this clause as indispensable for the8 reason that
it thus imposes upon Congress this power and this duty. 8
Thus Congress was intended to take the lead in enforcing the
amendments, and has a duty to do so. Furthermore, this is pragmatically
the best way to advance their purposes because it will assure greater
popular acceptance.
But of course Congress is not to be alone in enforcing the Civil War
Amendments. The principle of Marbury v. Madison requires that the
Court continue to obey its duty as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
The extreme deference to congressional determinations made pursuant to
the amendments' central purpose is therefore warranted, as the analysis
85 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.

86 ExParteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (emphasis added).
87 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325-26 (emphasis added).
88CoNG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1st Sess., 2766, 2768 (1866); quoted in Katzenbach
...
.
v. Morgan,, 384 U.S. at 648 n.. 8.
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immediately above demonstrates, but not absolute. It does not signal
abdication of judicial responsibility. Where Congress seeks to reach
conduct not contemplated by the amendments, the Court will intervene.89
And perhaps Oregon v. Mitchell signifies that this deference does not
extend to matters within the scope of the amendments' possible
construction but is limited to matters within the scope of their central
purpose-elimination of racial discrimination. 90
But there is more to this partnership. Each partner brings unique
skills and abilities with him. The Court has the ability to engage in
detached interpretation of the Constitution. The Court has experience
in difficult problems of statutory interpretation and application. The lower
courts are well adapted to hearing evidence designed to determine the
facts relevant to a particular dispute. Congress, by comparison, can
command greater public support for its action. Congress can initiate
nationwide investigations of certain practices and obtain an overall
perspective of a problem area, and then legislate against the specific types
of evils uncovered. 91 Finally, Congress is better able to balance competing
policy values and render an acceptable compromise.9 2
The partnership is an "uneasy" one because of inherent differences
between the two branches. Congress has a popular constituency, to which
each member must be at least somewhat responsive. The Supreme Court
is relatively removed from such pressures.9 3 And, overall, the members of
these institutions will have different views on close constitutional issues
because of their different backgrounds and because of the different
institutional framework within which each is daily involved. Generally,
this conflict among branches of government is viewed as beneficial,
because it generates checks and balances. But this inherent conflict must
perforce give way to a higher command in this area---obedience to
the imperatives of the Civil War Amendments.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court are bound by the unique
duties imposed by the Civil War Amendments to exercise their unique
powers in such a way as to maximize promotion of the civil rights
guaranteed by the amendments. When one branch acts to expand these
rights, conflict must usually be avoided. When one branch effectively
dilutes these rights, the Court is bound by the Marbury principle and the
Congress is bound by the enforcement clauses to intervene. This is, in
the final analysis, no more than a requirement that each branch exercise
89

See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
90 See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
91 Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CINN. L REV.
199,225-26 (1971).
92Id. at 260.
93

Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1011 (1965).
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its powers with the utmost good faith. But it is a strong good faith
requirement. The history of bloodshed, hatred and division, and the legacy
of continuing black oppression and racial tension teach this. And the
problem of equal civil rights is no mere academic issue for scholars to
argue about incessantly. As the Supreme Court has noted, the principles
involved "are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed
by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our9 4constitutional ideal of equal
justice under law is thus made a living truth."
But there is more than a duty to exercise the acquired powers with
good faith. Both branches of government are also bound by a unique
rule of constitutional stare decisis. This rule's existence has been recently
95
postulated by former Justice Goldberg. He argues that the impact of
stare decisis on constitutional safeguards of personal freedoms results
in a "rachet-like effect":
[Wihen the Supreme Court seeks to overrule in order to cut back
the individual's fundamental constitutional protections against
governmental interference, the commands of stare decisis are all
liberties,
but absolute; yet when a court overrules to expand personal
96
the doctrine interposes markedly less restrictive caution.
Five reasons were advanced in support of this theory.
First, constitutional safeguards of personal liberties are "instilled with
evils." 97
an innate capacity for growth to enable them to meet new
Constitutional safeguards are often framed with very specific evils in
mind, but are generally intended to apply to more than the specific form
or manifestation of an evil extant at a given point in history. Accordingly,
the language of a provision is usually framed so as to be susceptible to
wide construction. Indeed, even a narrowly worded clause such as the bill
of attainder clause is interpreted as a general safeguard and not narrowly
98
and technically and therefore soon to be outmoded. This concern is
certainly applicable to the Civil War Amendments-aimed at elimination
of the most pervasive and persistent social evil in American history. Racial
discrimination continually retreats to ever more subtle and concealed
methods, and if the purpose of those amendments is to be fulfilled, they
must continually be adapted to meet these challenges.
Second, constitutional stare decisis applies unevenly because this
promotes the Supreme Court's duty to safeguard against the tyranny of

94 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at 20.
9 GOLDBERG, supra note 84, at 65-97.
96 Id. at 74-75.
97 Id. at 82.

98 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442.
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the majority.9 9 Most of the safeguards of personal liberties are aimed at
protection of "politically impotent minorities.' 00 This is one of the
justifications for judicial review itself. But it also warns against exclusive
reliance upon the unfettered discretion of the Supreme Court for
protecting minorities, because "the Court has not always been insensitive
to political pressure or contemporary fears." 101 Thus, a stiff resistance by
stare decisis to the contraction by the Supreme Court itself of personal
rights is the best safeguard against Court submission to contemporary,
transitory pressures. 10 2 Again, this concern is directly relevant to the
Civil War Amendments. Their wording indicates that they were necessary
in order to assure, inter alia, citizenship, due process of law, and the
right to vote for racial minority citizens. And the past examples of
03
Dred Scott v. Sanford,1
Plessy v. Ferguson,104 and Korematsu v. United
05
States, read in light of the continued extreme political sensitivity of the
race issue, indisputably counsel agreement with this second reason.
Justice Goldberg's third argument is that the balance of reliance
interests counsel's protection of the individual. 05 If the Court overrules to
contract personal liberties, an ex post facto conviction may be the result;
if it overrules to expand, the prosecutor loses a case. 1' 7 The notion of
unfair surprise central to this argument suggests that interpretation
of rights under the Civil War Amendments should not be allowed to
operate restrictively.
The fourth argument emphasizes the symbolic importance of
Supreme Court decisions. The lack of precedent for significant contraction
of rights has shaped public expectations so as to expect continual
expansions. 0 8 This public expectation means that although there may be
initial grumbling over an expansion of rights, it will soon die down and
the decision will be accepted-thus aiding expansion. 109 It introduces
99 GOLDBERG at 86-87.
100 Id. at 87.
101 Id.
102 Id.at 88.
103 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857). In this case, the
Supreme Court refused to recognize Negro slaves as "persons" worthy of due process
protection of liberty, and considered them to be no more than "property."
104 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In this case, the Supreme Court created
the "separate but equal" doctrine, holding that the state could require racial
segregation in public transportation provided that the separate facilities were of
equal quality.
105 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In this case, the Supreme Court
upheld the "exclusion" of citizens of Japanese ancestry from the west coast and their
imprisonment in detention camps. No showing of specific disloyalty was required.
206 GOLDBERG at 88.
107 Id.

108 Id. at 90-91.
109

Id. at 91-92.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss1/4

16

Lippe: The Uneasy Partnership

Fail, 19731

THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP

greater impersonality to the decision, contributing to the respect for "the
rule of law."110 Conversely, even a slowdown in the rate of expansion
or a slight contraction will have a "multiplier effect" in symbolic
importance." These concerns are especially relevant to elimination of
racial discrimination. The most powerful weapon for eradicating racial
discrimination is a continued expectation of inexorable expansion of
protection for racial minorities. And, conversely, even the slightest
contraction would destroy years of progress, through the multiplier
effect of its symbolic message.
Fifth, there is the consideration of state powers. Past resistance to
expansion of rights was due to concern for protection of the states' role
12
in the federal system.' But once these powers are overridden "common
states not be given back any of their previous
the
that
sense" dictates
3
powers to restrict fundamental liberties.1 Again, this argument is most
significant concerning the Civil War Amendments, considering that their
major thrust is directed against certain exercises of state power.
Justice Goldberg ends his argument by noting "the interesting parallel"4
Constitution;-'
between judicial and legislative power to interpret the
thereby referring to the Supreme Court assertion that Congress can expand
5
but not abrogate or dilute rights under the Civil War Amendments." The
similarity is much more than a mere parallel. Mr. Justice Goldberg's
argument seems valid, especially so with regard to the Civil War
Amendments. What he has formulated is a rule for principled constitutional adjudication. This, of course, should be respected as binding the
Supreme Court. But when Congress undertakes to determine the scope of
the Civil War Amendments, it, too, is exercising a power of constitutional
adjudication. Hence, Congress, too, should be equally bound by this rule
of constitutional stare decisis. Responsibility follows power.
6
Thus, footnote 10 of Katzenbach v. Morgan' can be seen in proper
perspective. The Supreme Court was not fostering its own policy of
promoting civil rights legislation. The Court was not merely seeking
to preserve its own power. Rather, the Court was responding to the
affirmative duty which, concurrently with Congress, it is bound to follow:
promotion of the central purposes of the Civil War Amendments. And
by stating that Congress could not restrict the amendments' scope, the
Court was merely recognizing that the special rule of constitutional

110 id.at 75-76.
in Id. at 93.
U2 Id. at 94-95.
'-'3 Id. at 95.
14 Id. at 96-97.
US See text accompanying note 66 supra.
LLe 384 U.S. at 651 n. 10,
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stare decisis which restricts the Court in constitutional adjudication
is likewise applicable to Congress when engaged in determining the
scope of the amendments.

The Uneasy Partnership and the problem
of de facto racial segregation.
It has been stated that the key difference between de facto and
de jure racial segregation is purpose to segregate." 7 State conduct
"motivated by purposeful desire to perpetuate and maintain
a racially
segregated school" will be found unconstitutional, 118 but "impartially
maintained and administered" neighborhood school plans will not be,- 9
despite the fact that their objective results may be identical. What is
the proper response for the Partnership to this situation?
The judicial branch has, in the past, evidenced a reluctance to
strike down segregated school systems in the absence of a showing
of discriminatory intent in their establishment. But there is an indication
of abandonment of this restrictive interpretation.
0
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia"2
considered the legality
of the school district reorganization which had the effect of impeding
progress toward dismantling a dual system as ordered by a district court. It
had been found that there was no segregative purpose behind the
reorganization.21 The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected such a
test. It was noted that the existence of a discriminatory purpose "may add
to the discriminatory effect by intensifying the stigma of implied racial
inferiority," and that it could serve as a factor in weighing various
alternative desegregation proposals." 2 But the Court stated that it is "the
effect-not the purpose or motivation" which determines whether an
action is a permissible method of dismantling a dual school system.Y2
The Court concluded: "The existence of a permissible purpose cannot
24
sustain an action that has an impermissible effect.""1
On its facts, Wright is clearly limited to school systems in which
unconstitutional segregation had already been ascertained and which was
being eliminated under Court order. The Fifth Circuit, however, has
chosen not to take so narrow a view. In Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 313 F. Supp. 61, 74 (D. Colo. 1970),
modified, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972).
"-7

118 445 F.2d at 1000.

119 United States v. Board of Educ., Ind. S.D. No. 1, Tulsa, Okla., 459 F.2d 720 (10th
Cir. 1972).
120 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
121 Id. at 461.
122Id.
123Id. at 462.
1.24 Id.
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12
Independent School District, Z the Court, sitting en banc, found the
segregation in the Corpus Christi, Texas, school system constitutionally
impermissible. The segregation had occurred as a result of the superimposition and maintenance of a neighborhood school system upon
segregated residential patterns. The Court emphasized that the underpinnining of its past decisions had been the unlawful eflect of state
actions. 126 Accordingly, it reasoned as follows:
Discriminatory motive and purpose, while they may reinforce a
finding of effective segregation, are not necessary ingredients of
constitutional violations in the field of public education.

That there was an absence of state action involved in creating the
city's residential pattern is of no significance. The Board imposed
a neighborhood school plan, ab initio, upon a clear and established
pattern of residential segregation in the face of an obvious and
inevitable result.127
It has been argued by Professor Cox that the extreme deference
a vast
to Congressional enforcement legislation "clears the way for
12
At the
rights."'
human
promoting
legislation
congressional
expansion of
same time, it was asserted that the Katzenbach decisions indicated
judicial reluctance to take the initiative, primarily due to recognition of
the judiciary's lesser ability to command public acceptance of its
13
pronouncements. This view appears to be in accord with political reality.
maintains the primacy of congressional responsibility
also
it
Furthermore,
0
for implementation of equal civil rights for all regardless of race.1
Professor Cox found it clear that Congress possessed the power under
the enforcement clauses to eliminate de facto racial segregation in schools

125Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.

1972), appeal pending.
126 Id. at 150.
Id. at 149. See also United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 864-65
1Vr
(5th
n. 25 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122, 125Colo.,
Cir. 1972) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Banks
445 F.2d 990, 999-1001 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972);
San
v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1179-80, 1182-83 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Johnson v.
1971);
Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315, 1318, 1341 (N.D. Calif.
1971).
St. Mary of Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 403-404 (N.D. Ill.
But see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548-49 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. Board of Educ., Indep. School Dist. No.
1, Tulsa, Okla., 459 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1972); Gomperts v. Chase, 329 F. Supp.
1192, 1195 (N.D. Calif. 1971).
128

Cox, supranote 76, at 107.

129 See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
130 $ee text accompanying notes 85-89 supra,
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by legislation "enforcing" the equal protection clause.-3 ' Yet Congress
has not chosen to follow his suggestion.
It is on this issue that the Uneasy Partnership bears the greatest
potential for future dynamic development. It is possible that the judiciary
will become increasingly dissatisfied with congressional inaction on the
issue of de facto segregation, and finally take the initiative itself. This
is clearly the approach which the Fifth Circuit would choose. And
it is arguable that Wright indicates that the Supreme Court is moving
toward that position.
It is also possible that the Court perceives a genuine limitation of its
own power in applying the amendments of their own force. 3 2 If this is
the case, social desirability of ending de facto segregation will not give the
judiciary authority which it lacks otherwise. Perhaps Congress is violating
its duty to promote actively and conscientiously the purposes of the
Civil War Amendments. But it is most unclear what the judiciary can
do to require obedience to this strong affirmative duty.
Conclusion
The issue of what shall be done to eliminate de facto racial
segregation in public schools is most difficult and perplexing. The Uneasy
Partnership must rise to the occasion by acting positively to actualize
the American ideal of equal educational opportunity.
Actualization of the purposes of the Civil War Amendments remains
the highest challenge to American jurisprudence and, if ever accomplished, would represent its greatest victory. To meet this challenge, the
nation has created a unique institution-The Uneasy Partnership-in
which Congress and the Supreme Court are simultaneously pressured,
guided, and restricted in fulfillment of their task. The institution has
far-reaching powers, and will be equal to the task if Congress and the
Supreme Court strive in a dedicated manner to obey their duties.

131

Cox, supra note 76, at 107-108.
text accompanying notes 12-14, 53-54, and 85-88 supra.

132 Cf.
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